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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of
the consequences of worker displacement in France and the United States. I
estimate wage losses of displaced workers in the two countries and examine
the relative contribution of two important sources of post-displacement wage
adjustments. The ﬁrst one relates to the loss of seniority-accumulated ﬁrm-
speciﬁc earnings potential. The second one arises from match heterogeneity.
Identiﬁcation of the relative contribution of these two sources can be achieved
given separate estimates of returns to seniority. I show that, while the order
of magnitude of total wage losses are comparable in the two economies (10 to
15%), the sources of wage adjustments diﬀer strongly: all of the wage decline
in France seems to be due to the loss of accumulated ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings
potential, while in the US, more than half of measured wage losses arise from
a downgrading of displaced workers into lower quality job matches.
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The microeconomic consequences of worker displacement, deﬁned as permanent job
losses, independent of individual performance, and arising from industrial restruc-
turing, plant closing and mass layoﬀ, have recently received considerable attention.
While existing research has brought a detailed description of the US case, evidence
from European countries is still relatively sparse.1 Furthermore, for both Europe
and the US, the structural determinants of observed post-displacement outcomes
remain largely unknown. The objective of this paper is to provide a comparative
assessment of the extent and the determinants of post-displacement individual wage
adjustments in France and the United States.
From a descriptive point of view, numerous studies have analyzed, over the
last decade, the impact of such worker dislocation on individual earnings in the
United States, and have provided strong evidence that the average US displaced
worker suﬀer severe earnings losses, on the order of 10 to 25%. Furthermore, they
have shown that these earnings losses not only arise from the occurrence of post-
displacement joblessness but also originate, to a large extent, from a persistent fall
in individual wages, upon re-employment.
More recently, several papers have also investigated whether comparable post-
displacement wage adjustments were at work on presumably rigid European labor
markets. Available evidence suggest that, on average, European displaced workers
experience signiﬁcant but possibly smaller wage losses than their US counterparts.
However, a strict comparison with US results is often hindered by cross-study
1See Kuhn (2002) and the references therein for available evidence on European countries.
2diﬀerences in econometric speciﬁcation and in the deﬁnition and measurement of
worker displacement. Hence, whether worker displacement implies similar wage
losses in Europe and the US largely remains an open question. The ﬁrst contribution
of this paper is to address this question, by estimating wage losses of displaced worker
using a single econometric framework and comparable longitudinal micro-data from
the French Employment surveys and the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
Obviously, one should not a priori expect worker dislocation to induce similar
wage losses for displaced workers in the two countries, since wage losses will result
from several aspects of wage-setting mechanisms that are likely to vary across
countries. Unfortunately, in this respect, the structural determinants of observed
wage adjustments have to a large extent remained unstudied. In fact, it is striking to
notice that post-displacement wage losses have received very diﬀerent interpretations
on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, worker displacement is often seen
as the disruption of an on-going long-term employment relationship and many papers
tend to attribute observed wage losses to the loss of ﬁrm or industry seniority. Ac-
cording to this point of view, post-displacement wage adjustments would result from
the loss of accumulated ﬁrm- or industry-speciﬁc earnings potential originating from
speciﬁc human capital accumulation or compensation deferral. On the contrary, the
European commonsense usually stresses the role of job match heterogeneity in the
explanation of post-displacement wage adjustments and the lack thereof. It sees
post-displacement outcomes as the result of displaced workers’ job search strategy
among heterogeneous jobs: according to this interpretation, observed wage losses
would mostly reﬂect the extent to which displaced workers are willing (or able) to
3take on low-paying jobs in order to return to employment, regardless of previous
job seniority. While both accumulated ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings potential and match
heterogeneity are likely to contribute to post-displacement wage adjustments in
Europe and the US, no systematic account of the contribution of each of these two
determinants has been provided yet.
The second contribution of this paper is to empirically disentangle these two
components and provide an analysis of the determinants of post-displacement wage
adjustments. Beyond the descriptive comparison of wage losses in Europe and the
US, identifying the sources of observed wage adjustments appears important for at
least two reasons. First, from an analytical point of view, it may help characterize
the speciﬁcities of labor market dynamics and wage-setting mechanisms at work
in diﬀerent countries. Second, from a prescriptive point of view, it may also help
determine what type of public policy, e.g. training or job search assistance, could
best alleviate the individual cost of worker displacement.
Previous research has already provided evidence that wage losses rise with pre-
displacement seniority. Yet, this descriptive result falls short of identifying the con-
tribution of intra-ﬁrm wage-seniority dynamics to observed wage losses, since higher
pre-displacement seniority can also be associated with higher pre-displacement match
quality. Unlike previous research on worker displacement, this paper takes into
account the endogeneity of pre-displacement seniority. It relies on separate estimates
of the within-ﬁrm returns to seniority, in each country, to determine the contribution
of seniority-related ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings potential to observed wage losses and to
residually assess the contribution of match heterogeneity.
4Two main results emerge from this paper. First, it appears that wage losses
experienced by French displaced workers amount, on average, to about 10-15%,
a ﬁgure only slightly lower than wage losses estimated for displaced US workers.
Second, the analysis of the sources of wage adjustments reveals that, despite a
comparable order of magnitude, the underlying determinants wage losses diﬀer
markedly in the two countries: in France, most of observed wage losses arise from the
loss of seniority-related ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings potential, while in the US, wage losses
are primarily explained by a downgrading of displaced workers into lower quality
matches, beyond the loss of seniority-related earnings components.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I analyze, from
a theoretical perspective, the structural determinants of post-displacement wage
adjustments and discuss related work from previous research. In section 3, I discuss
the empirical estimation procedure and describe the data used in the empirical
analysis. Section 4 presents basic estimates of wage losses of displaced workers and
section 5 examines the contribution of pre-displacement job seniority and match
heterogeneity to estimated post-displacement wage adjustments.
2 Determinants of post-displacement wage losses :
a theoretical discussion
The estimation of wage losses of displaced workers usually involves a comparison
of post-displacement wage to either pre-displacement earnings or to a counterfac-
tual of what individual earnings would have been in the absence of displacement.
Consequently, understanding the impact of job displacement requires an analysis of
5both the pre-displacement wage structure and the post-displacement re-employment
process. In this section, I lay out a simple model of labor market dynamics to analyze
the determinants of post-displacement wage adjustments and discuss results from
previous research.
2.1 A simple model of labor market dynamics
and post-displacement wage losses
Consider an economy where homogeneous workers can be either employed or un-
employed. Unemployed workers receive job oﬀers with probability λ0 per period of
time. The economy consists of two types of ﬁrms : high-wage ﬁrms paying entry
wage level wH and low-wage ﬁrms paying entry wage level wL, with wL < wH. Let p
denote the probability that the job oﬀered be of the high-wage type, conditional on
receiving a job oﬀer. For now, wage heterogeneity can, indiﬀerently, be seen as the
result of either heterogeneity in match productivity or non-competitive wage rents.
For simplicity, assume that job termination is a deterministic event: employed
workers are exogenously displaced two periods after they entered the employment
pool, regardless of previous employment history, and ﬂow back into unemployment.2
Over the course of their employment spells, workers receive alternative job oﬀers with
probability λ1 per period of time, that are drawn from the same distribution as for
unemployed workers. For workers staying with the same ﬁrm in period 2, assume
that wage grows at a rate g per period of time and that on-the-job wage growth is
2As a consequence, job-to-job movers do not increase their expected employment duration by
changing jobs. This strong assumption implies that job switching decision is only governed by wage
considerations, as would be the case in an inﬁnite horizon model with Markov separations. See
for instance Bunzel et al. (1999) for a complete analysis of job search strategies with on-the-job
wage growth in a stochastic separation model.
6ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Workers employed in high-wage ﬁrms will never change ﬁrm over the
course of their employment spell. Workers employed at low-wage ﬁrms will change
job when receiving a high-wage oﬀer, as long as wH/wL > (1 + g) which will be
assumed throughout the rest of this section.
In this setting, unemployed workers job search strategy consists of two options:
either accept high wage oﬀers only (denoted strategy I) or accept all job oﬀers
(denoted strategy II).3 Strategy I trades a higher expected gain when exiting un-
employed against a lower probability of ﬁnding a job. Depending on the value of the
relevant structural parameters, this strategy may yield higher expected discounted
pay-oﬀ than the alternative of accepting all types of oﬀers. Higher unemployment
beneﬁts, a larger discrepancy between wL and wH, a higher value of λ0 or a lower
value of λ1 will make this situation more likely to occur.
As a consequence, two equilibria may arise on the labor market. These two
equilibria will diﬀer not only in terms of unemployment dynamics but also in terms
of inter-ﬁrm mobility and wage dispersion. The main characteristics of each equi-
librium are summarized in table 1.
The case where unemployed workers are willing to accept all job oﬀers exhibits
low unemployment, high worker mobility (both out of unemployment and between
jobs) and high equilibrium wage dispersion.4 In this case, equilibrium cross-section
wage dispersion arises from three factors. The ﬁrst one is the initial dispersion in
accepted wage oﬀers. The second one is the opportunity for workers in low-wage
3I rule out the possibility for unemployed workers to never accept any oﬀer, assuming for
instance that unemployment beneﬁts are lower than wH.
4Unemployment rates reported in table 1 derive from the usual ﬂow equilibrium condition.
Equilibrium unemployment rate is given by s/(s + h), where s and h denote the exit rate from
employment and unemployment respectively. Under strategy L, h is equal to λ0. Furthermore, in
this simpliﬁed model the equilibrium aggregate exit rate out of employment is 1/2.
7ﬁrms to move to high-wage ﬁrms at the end of their ﬁrst period of employment.
The third source of wage heterogeneity is on-the-job wage growth: even controlling
for entry wage level, wH or wL, employed workers are still heterogeneous in terms
of job seniority and thus wage rate .
On the contrary, when unemployed workers are only willing to accept high-wage
job oﬀers, the labor market equilibrium exhibits higher unemployment and lower
worker mobility: unemployment duration is higher and there is no direct inter-
ﬁrm worker mobility. This case also exhibits a lesser degree of cross-section wage
dispersion: there is now a single entry wage level and wage heterogeneity only arises
from heterogeneity in job seniority.
2.2 Sources of wage losses
In this model, workers exogenously separated from their current employer after two
periods in employment will, on average, experience wage losses upon re-employment.
Table 1 reports wage losses of displaced workers for each possible labor market
equilibrium.5 It emphasizes two major sources of wage adjustments following job
displacement.
The ﬁrst one relates to on-the-job wage growth: workers who stayed with the
same ﬁrm for two periods lose the ﬁrm-speciﬁc additional earnings potential g that
they had accumulated as they increased their seniority with their pre-displacement
employer. We will henceforth refer to this source of wage losses as A-losses.
The second source of wage adjustments arises from on-the-job search. Workers
5Here, wage losses of displaced workers are deﬁned as the average relative diﬀerence between
pre-and post-displacement wage.
8exiting unemployment into a low-wage ﬁrm have an opportunity to subsequently
move to a high-wage ﬁrm. Hence, the probability of being employed in a high-
wage ﬁrm is higher at the time when displacement occurs than at the time of re-
employment. This higher probability of being in a high-wage ﬁrm represents the
beneﬁts derived from extended job search and will be lost upon job displacement.
We will henceforth refer to this source of wage losses as S-losses.
In order to clarify the distinction introduced here, it is worth emphasizing that,
in both cases, wage losses originate from the existence of some earnings components
that cannot be transferred to the post-displacement job. What really distinguishes
A-losses from S-losses is the speciﬁc aspect of labor market dynamics that has
led to the emergence of these non-transferable earnings components. A-losses,
reﬂect non-transferable earnings components that were accumulated with seniority
on the pre-displacement job and solely rely on the intra-ﬁrm dynamics of wages and
seniority. On the contrary, S-losses reﬂect non-transferable earnings components
acquired through extended on-the-job search and inter-ﬁrm worker mobility and
result from the external labor market dynamics of job prospection.
This can be illustrated by comparing the two possible equilibria of our simple
model. These two equilibria exhibit diﬀerent mixes of A- and S-losses. Under
job search strategy I, there are no gains from on-the-job search and workers stay
with the same employer for two periods. The only source of wage adjustments
is A-losses that amount to g. Under strategy II, a fraction λ1(1 − p) of displaced
workers will have moved from a low-wage match to a high-wage match at the time of
displacement. These workers will not have accumulated any ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings
potential g at the time of displacement and will only incur S-losses. The rest of
9displaced workers will incur A-losses. In this second case, average S-losses amount
to λ1(1 − p)(wH − wL)/w and average A-losses amount to g[1 − λ1(1 − p)wL/w].
Decomposing observed wage losses along these lines, as will be done in the rest
of this paper, can ﬁrst provide an empirical assessment of the diﬀerent factors
contributing to individual wage dynamics. Furthermore, this decomposition can
also be useful in addressing several analytical and policy-related issues regarding
the consequences of worker displacement. One important concern, underlying early
studies, is that worker displacement may induce severe eﬃciency losses arising from
the destruction of speciﬁc human capital. Absent any measurable concept of speciﬁc
human capital, this notion is often proxied, in empirical work, by job tenure within
a given ﬁrm, which in turn suggests to assimilate eﬃciency losses with A-losses.
The theoretical analysis developed here indicates that this interpretation cannot
be taken for granted. First, A-losses may not necessarily correspond to a loss of
speciﬁc human capital, since upward sloping wage-seniority proﬁles can also arise
from compensation deferral, as in Lazear (1979), absent any form of speciﬁc human
capital investment. Secondly, part of S-losses may reﬂect eﬃciency losses as well.
This will be the case if inter-ﬁrm wage heterogeneity reﬂects heterogeneity in match
productivity, as in Jovanovic (1979). Under this interpretation, job search appears
as a productive activity and S-losses will incorporate match-eﬃciency losses. This
suggests two major caveats in the analysis of eﬃciency losses: ﬁrst, eﬃciency losses
may go beyond accumulated ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, and, second, they can-
not unambiguously be measured absent complementary information on individual
productivity, usually not available in survey data.
10Beside eﬃciency losses, wage losses of displaced workers can also be analyzed
in terms of social fairness. In this matter, the A-S distinction yields stronger
prescriptions. A-losses appear unambiguously unfair, regardless of the ultimate
determinants of a positive wage-seniority relationship, be it the acceptance of initial
underpayment or the costly investment in speciﬁc human capital. On the contrary,
unless access to better matches can be ascribed to inter-individual diﬀerences in job
search eﬀort (as opposed to luck), S-losses may appear less unjust and can be seen,
from the worker’s perspective, as the re-distribution of job-search rents.
Finally, distinguishing these two sources of wage adjustments can be informative
for the design of public policies aimed at alleviating the individual cost of worker
displacement. If wage adjustments mostly arise from S-losses, then job-search
assistance policies may be more successful in attenuating post-displacement wage
losses. On the contrary, if A-losses are the driving force, training policy would
appear more adequate.
2.3 Discussion of previous research
Several papers have previously analyzed the determinants of wage losses induced by
worker displacement, essentially for the United States. Among the likely suspects
considered in empirical work are “the development of nontransferable human capital
in a job, unionization, good job matches, eﬃciency wages, internal labor markets
and incentive pay mechanisms” (Kletzer, 1998, p.127). These diﬀerent explanations
can be straightforwardly linked to the distinction between A-losses (“development of
nontransferable human capital”, “internal labor markets and incentive pay mecha-
nisms”) and S-losses (“unionization, good job matches, eﬃciency wages”) considered
11here. However, despite extensive descriptive evidence, there still remains consider-
able uncertainty on the empirical contribution of each of these diﬀerent explanations.
Many studies, including, among others, Farber (1993), Ruhm (1987), Kletzer
(1989) and Kuhn and Sweetman (1998), have focused on the impact of job seniority
on post-displacement outcomes and have established that wage losses rise with
pre-displacement tenure.6 This result has usually been interpreted as evidence of
“the importance of specialized human capital that accumulated with time” (Topel,
1990). It also lies at the heart of Hamermesh (1987)’s estimation of the social
losses implied by job displacement. There are, however, two challenges to this
interpretation. First, as already mentioned, positive returns to ﬁrm seniority may
arise from factors other than speciﬁc human capital accumulation. Secondly, as
emphasized in Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and a
later paper by Topel (1991), pre-displacement job seniority may be endogenous and
positively related to match quality. Consequently, the relationship between seniority
and wage losses of displaced workers can neither identify the extent of speciﬁc human
capital losses nor the contribution of seniority-accumulated ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings
potential, i.e. A-losses.
Other papers have also stressed that displaced workers changing industry upon
re-employed usually experience larger wage losses (Swaim and Podgursky, 1987;
Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993b). Furthermore, it has also been shown that
wage losses rise more with pre-displacement seniority for industry changers than for
industry stayers (Neal, 1995). This has often been interpreted as evidence that, to
6For instance, Farber (1993)’s estimates imply that one additional year of pre-displacement
seniority increase wage losses by about 1 percentage point.
12some extent, speciﬁc human capital accumulated in a given ﬁrm may be partially
transferred to other ﬁrms in the same industry. This suggests that the measurement
of A-losses should incorporate this additional dimension of accumulated earnings
potential speciﬁcity. However, as noted in Kletzer (1996) this portability of speciﬁc
human capital across ﬁrms within a given sector seems limited to a narrow number
of industries. Furthermore, larger wage losses for more senior industry switchers
may also arise from S-losses in the presence of industry-speciﬁc labor market rents
(Krueger and Summers, 1988). The contribution of pre-displacement rents, is also
conﬁrmed by evidence that workers displaced from larger ﬁrms and/or unionized
jobs usually experience larger wage losses (Carrington and Zaman, 1994; Krashinsky,
forthcoming).
Lastly, diﬀerent papers concerned with high-unemployment European countries
have also suggested that wage losses of displaced workers may be used to infer the
level of individual reservation wages, as they reﬂect post-displacement job search
strategies.7 The preceding theoretical model indicates that, while unemployment
search strategy clearly inﬂuences post-displacement outcomes, it is by no means the
sole determinant of wage losses. On the one hand, A-losses appears only determined
by pre-displacement job duration and returns to seniority. On the other hand,
lower reservation wages clearly lead to higher S-losses, as they will increase the
prospects for subsequent proﬁtable inter-ﬁrm mobility. Unfortunately, S-losses also
depend on the rate of arrival of alternative job oﬀers. Hence, low S-losses cannot
be unambiguously ascribed to high unemployed workers reservation wages and can
7See for instance Leonard and Van Audenrode (1995), Cohen et al. (1997) and Rosolia and
Saint-Paul (1998).
13only provide a reduced form assessment of the joint contribution of several factors
inﬂuencing external labor market dynamics.
3 Econometric models and data description
3.1 Econometric speciﬁcations
3.1.1 Wage losses
From a descriptive perspective, the eﬀect of job displacement on individual earnings
can be empirically analyzed using an augmented Mincerian earnings model borrowed
from Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (JLS) (1993a):
wi,t = αi + Xi,tβ + Di,tδ + γt + εi,t (1)
where, wi,t denotes the logarithm of individual i’s wage at time t; Xi,t is a vector
of observable individual characteristics; Di,t is a dummy variable equal to one if
individual i was displaced at some point before time t; αi is an individual ﬁxed
eﬀect; γt represents a time-varying eﬀect common to all workers; εi,t is a mean zero
iid error term. In this equation, the eﬀect of worker displacement on subsequent
earnings is summarized by the coeﬃcient δ.
Diﬀerent strategies have been previously implemented to estimate δ. The sim-
plest one consists in a cross-section estimation of equation 1 on a sample of displaced
and non-displaced workers. In the presence of individual ﬁxed eﬀects, this will yield
an inconsistent estimator of δ if, on average, displaced workers have diﬀerent unmea-
sured characteristics αi. Using the diﬀerence between pre- and post-displacement
14wages of displaced workers to identify δ, as often done in studies based on the CPS
Displaced Worker Survey, eliminates individual heterogeneity bias but at the cost
of other possible inconsistencies, since it will confound changes in Xit and γt with
the eﬀect of worker displacement.
In this paper, I use a “diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence” estimation of equation 1 to
measure the eﬀect of worker displacement on wages, δ. This amounts to estimate
the following model:
wi,t − wi,t−τ = (Xi,t − Xi,t−τ)β + (γt − γt−τ) + Di,tδ + (εi,t − εi,t−τ) (2)
where Di,t will be equal to one for workers displaced between time t − τ and t.
Equation 2 is estimated on a sample composed of displaced and non-displaced
workers. The latter reference group allows to identify both (Xi,t − Xi,t−τ)β and
(γt − γt−τ). Following JLS, I restrict the reference group of non-displaced workers
to individuals who have stayed with the same ﬁrm between t − τ and t.
Since most observed individual earnings determinants (e.g. education, marital
status, region of residence) will be constant between t−τ and t, Xi,t−Xi,t−τ will only
capture the impact of changes in labor market experience. For all observations, this
will be ﬁxed and equal to τ given that only potential experience is measured in my
data. Yet, in order to account for non-linearities and heterogeneity in experience-
wage proﬁles, estimation of equation 2 will incorporate individual experience at
date t − τ and level of education, as control variables for Xi,t − Xi,t−τ. Estimation
of 2 will also include state-dummies in order to account for regional diﬀerences in
overall wage growth γt −γt−τ. Lastly, equation 2 includes year dummies to capture
15variations over time in aggregate wage growth.
3.1.2 Determinants of wage losses
The decomposition discussed in the previous section can be incorporated to the
empirical analysis by modelling the contribution of worker seniority and match
heterogeneity to individual earnings. To do so, consider the following model8:
wi,t = αi + Xi,tβ + Si,tψ + φi,t + γt + εi,t (3)
where Si,t denotes ﬁrm-seniority and φi,t represents a ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁc to the
ﬁrm or match of individual i at date t.9 For non-displaced workers, the change in
log wage between t − τ and t will be given by:
wi,t − wi,t−τ = (Xi,t − Xi,t−τ)β + (γt − γt−τ) + τψ + (εi,t − εi,t−τ) (4)
Consequently, the eﬀect of displacement on wages measured in equation 2 will
be equal to:
δ = E[(Si,t − Si,t−τ − τ)ψ|Di,t = 1] + E[φi,t − φi,t−τ|Di,t = 1] (5)
The two expectations in equation 5 respectively capture the contribution of losses
of seniority accumulated ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings potential (A-losses) and changes in
8To simplify notations, higher order terms in seniority have been omitted but are included in
the estimation.
9In fact, ﬁrm and worker-ﬁrm match ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be distinguished without linked
employer-employee data. Furthermore, φi,t may also capture industry ﬁxed-eﬀects that are not
explicitly modelled here.
16average match or ﬁrm quality (S-losses) to wage losses of displaced workers.
Again, adding an interaction term of the form Di,t×Si,t−τ in equation 2 will not
allow to measure the contribution of A-losses since φi,t−τ will also be correlated with
Si,t−τ. However, the contributions of A- and S-losses can be identiﬁed, provided
that a consistent estimate of ψ is available. If so, one can deﬁne and compute ωi,t
the value of individual wages, net of returns to ﬁrm seniority, as ωi,t = wi,t − Si,tb ψ.
One can then estimate a variant of equation 2 using ωi,t − ωi,t−τ as a dependant
variable.10 In this case, the coeﬃcient δ of the displacement dummy variable will be
equal to E[φi,t − φi,t−τ|Di,t = 1], that is S-losses.
3.2 Data
The comparative analysis is based on a panel extracted from the French Employment
surveys (enquˆ etes Emploi, henceforth FES) and on the US Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID).
3.2.1 French data
The FES is a labor force survey conducted each year by the French national statistics
institute (INSEE) over a representative sample of approximately 60 000 households.
All interviews take place during the month of March. The survey includes detailed
information on individual characteristics (age, education, region of residence), job
characteristics (industry, seniority), monthly wage earned during the previous month
and number of hours worked. Unemployed job seekers at the time of the interview
10Note that this amounts to net out the eﬀect of seniority in both the pre- and post-displacement
jobs.
17are asked to report the reason for unemployment. Individuals who changed employer
during the previous year and those going through unemployment during the previous
year but who are no longer unemployed at the survey date are not asked to report
the reason for employer change or unemployment. Hence displacement status can
only be assessed for individuals being unemployment at the time of the interview.
Among the diﬀerent reasons for unemployment, the questionnaire distinguishes
between voluntary quits, end of seasonal and ﬁxed-duration contract, individuals
previously out of the labor force, workers on “collective” permanent layoﬀ (li-
cenciement collectif ) and workers on “individual” permanent layoﬀ (licenciement
individuel). The distinction between individual and collective layoﬀ is based on the
number of people being laid-oﬀ from a single ﬁrm at a given date: collective (re-
spectively individual) layoﬀs correspond to situations where more (respectively less)
than 10 workers at a time where terminated from the same ﬁrm. This distinction
only partially matches the deﬁnition of worker displacement, as displaced workers are
usually deﬁned as workers losing their job for reasons independent of their individual
performance or behavior. While workers on “collective” layoﬀs would certainly ﬁt
this deﬁnition, the situation of people on “individual” layoﬀs is more ambiguous
and could correspond to either workers displaced from smaller ﬁrms or workers ﬁred
for poor work performance of behavior. In order to distinguish these two groups, I
control, in the estimation, for two separate job displacement dummies: Mass layoﬀ
will be equal to one for individuals being unemployed and reporting a collective
layoﬀ; the second one Other layoﬀ / Fired will be equal to one for unemployed
workers on “individual ” layoﬀ.
This paper uses data from the 1990 through 1997 FES. Since one third of
18the sample is renewed each year and each household is interviewed during three
consecutive years, I can construct six three-year individual panels of labor market
history. The ﬁnal data set used in the estimations for France pools these six short
panels. Given that displacement status is only observed for those being unemployed
in a least one wave, and that estimation of equation 2 requires both a pre- and a
post-displacement wage observations, displaced workers used in the estimation of
wage losses will consist in individuals employed at date t−2, who subsequently lost
their job and were still unemployed at date t−1 and who were re-employed at date
t, where t denotes the last period of the three-year panel. The control group consists
in individuals who stayed with the same ﬁrm between t − 2 and t.
3.2.2 US data
The US data are taken from the 1983 through 1992 waves of the PSID. It provides
information on worker and job characteristics very similar to the one collected in the
FES, together with a wealth of data on individual and household income.11 Earnings
data used in this paper refer to hourly and weekly wage earned from the main job
held as of the survey date.12
Assessing worker displacement status in the PSID exposes to ambiguities that
are similar to those encountered with the FES. Among involuntary separations,
the PSID distinguishes between two reasons for job termination. The ﬁrst one
11As already noted in the literature, original self-reported tenure data exhibit many
inconsistencies in the PSID. In numerous cases, year-to-year tenure variation for individuals staying
on the same job fail to equal one. In such cases, job tenure data was recoded as in Topel (1991).
12The PSID provides two diﬀerent variables for hourly wage rates: the ﬁrst one is computed as
the average of yearly labor income and hours on all jobs held during the previous year; the second
one, used in this paper, is the self-reported hourly wage rate on the current main job at the time
of the interview. Weekly wage rate is computed by multiplying this latter variable by the usual
number of hours worked per week.
19corresponds to workers who lost their job because “their company folded, changed
hands, moved out of town, their employer died or went out of business”. We deﬁne
a Mass layoﬀ dummy equal to one for individuals in this group. The second reason
for termination corresponds to workers who were “laid oﬀ or ﬁred”. Again, this
group is likely to include workers being terminated for reasons related to individual
characteristics. We deﬁne an Other layoﬀ / Fired dummy variable equal to one
for workers in this category who do not return to their previous employer and zero
otherwise. In order to insure comparability with our French sample of displaced
workers, we further restrict our sample of displaced US workers to individuals who
experienced some spell of unemployment.13
As for our French sample, estimation of equation 2 uses two-year changes in log
individual wages. Since our PSID data cover the period 1983-1992, each individual
in the sample contributes multiple wage changes observations to the estimation. For
each year t ∈ [1985,1992], we assign individual-year observations to the displacement
groups if individuals report the occurrence of a job displacement, as deﬁned above,
between t and t − 2.14 The control group consists of individuals who stayed at the
same ﬁrm between t and t − 2.
13Not imposing the additional restriction that displaced workers experience unemployment has
the following eﬀects on estimated wage losses. For individuals in the Mass layoﬀ group, estimated
wage losses are about .03 log points lower (in absolute value), but the diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant for
highly educated workers. For individuals in the Other layoﬀ / Fired group, it decreases estimated
wage losses by .01 log points but the diﬀerence in estimates is not signiﬁcant.
14Restricting the displacement sample to individuals dismissed between t − 1 and t − 2 would
more closely match the deﬁnition of the French displacement sample, but would strongly reduce
the size of the sample, without signiﬁcant eﬀect on estimated wage losses.
203.2.3 Samples restrictions and description
I restrict my ﬁnal samples to male heads of household aged 25 to 55 years old in
t−2 and exclude self-employed workers from the analysis. Imposing these restrictions
gives a sample of 3100 individuals and a total of about 12625 observations in the
PSID data and a sample of 20904 individuals and observations in the FES panel.
The main characteristics of each sample are given in table 2. In the FES, 531
individuals experience a displacement episode that can be assessed based on reports
at date t − 1.15 The PSID data provides a total of 568 displacement episodes.
For both countries, I deﬁne a three-level educational classiﬁcation. In the US, low
education corresponds to high-school dropouts; medium education to high school
graduates; high education to levels of education higher than high school. The
classiﬁcation for France takes into account the lower average educational attainment
of the French workforce: medium education includes individuals with a vocational
degree lower than high school and individuals with upper secondary education
who did not complete high school; high education includes high-school graduates
(baccalaur´ eat) and above; low education corresponds to individuals with less than
an intermediate vocational degree. On average, in both countries, displaced workers
tend to have lower education than the control group of job stayers. Overall, they
also tend to be younger and have less ﬁrm seniority at date t − 2, although French
displaced workers tend to have higher pre-displacement seniority than their US
counterparts.
Lastly, in both countries, displaced workers experience nominal wage losses,
15A total of 1086 individuals experience a displacement episode that can be assessed using reports
at date t and t − 1.
21around -.07 log points in France and -0.4 log points in the US, while job stayers
experience nominal wage gains, around .06 log points in France and .10 in the US.
4 Wage losses in France and the United States
4.1 Basic results
Table 3 presents estimates of the average eﬀect of job displacement on wages in both
countries. All estimates are based on equation 2.
Estimates based on PSID data (column 2 and 10) corroborate results from other
studies of job displacement in the US.16 On average displaced workers experience
a .15 log points fall in weekly wages relative to the control group of job stayers
(column 2) and wage losses appear very similar for the two groups of displaced
workers. This fall in wages appears primarily driven by a .13 log points fall in
hourly wage (column 10). The discrepancy between estimates based on weekly and
hourly wages also indicates that change in hours of work might partially account for
the fall in weekly earnings, a fact that is consistent with the ﬁnding mentioned in
Farber (1993) that a signiﬁcant fraction of pre-displacement full-time workers return
to a part-time job.
In France, displaced workers also experience signiﬁcant wage losses. Relative to
job stayers, French workers displaced in a mass layoﬀ suﬀer a .12 log points fall in
weekly wage and a .09 log points fall in hourly wage rate. Workers laid-oﬀ in other
circumstances or ﬁred experience slightly larger wage losses: weekly wage losses
16See for instance Kletzer (1998) for a survey and Ruhm (1991) for estimates of wage losses of
displaced workers based on PSID data.
22amount to .15 log points and hourly wage losses to .13 log points. These higher
wage losses for workers in this group are consistent with the fact that part of these
workers may have been dismissed for reasons related to individual performance or
behavior.17 Comparison of hourly and weekly wage losses indicates that in France,
job displacement also induces a change in hours worked.
However, given the long average duration of unemployment in France and the
constraints related to the identiﬁcation of job displacement status in the FES,
only about one half of the French mass layoﬀ sample and one third of the Other
layoﬀ / Fired sample have returned to employment in period t. This may lead
to unrepresentative estimates of wage losses of displaced workers for France if the
re-employment and wage adjustment process diﬀer for the censored observations.
Table 2 allows to compare the characteristics of re-employed displaced workers
to those of the overall displaced sample. For the Mass Layoﬀ group, the two
samples appear very similar, while for the Other layoﬀ / Fired group, re-employed
displaced workers tend to have lower pre-displacement seniority. To examine possible
sample selection in the wage losses and re-employment process, table 7 provides
Heckman two-step estimates of an individual wage growth equation. Variables
included in the re-employment equation and excluded from the wage growth equation
are unemployment duration at date t − 1 and, for workers in the Other layoﬀ /
Fired group, seniority in t − 2.18 While both variables have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the probability of re-employment, panel B of table 7 provides no indication of
17For these workers job displacement might signal lower intrinsic productivity, which may in
turn induce larger wage losses, as suggested in Gibbons and Katz (1991).
18As discussed in section 4.3 for pre-displacement seniority does not seem to inﬂuence wage
growth for Other layoﬀ / Fired displaced workers.
23signiﬁcant selection eﬀect, a result that is consistent with previous studies that have
cast doubt on the importance of selection bias in estimates of the wage losses of
displaced workers.19.
Overall, these results suggest the existence of signiﬁcant post-displacement wage
losses in France, that are only slightly lower than those found for displaced US
workers. Hence, the consequences of worker displacement on individual welfare does
not appear particularly milder in France, which stands at odd with the common
view of a “rigid” French labor market.
4.2 Results by level of education
This general picture still holds when one split the total sample by level of education,
according to the classiﬁcation described in section 3.2.
For workers with a medium level of education, wage losses appear higher in the
US than in France. The fall in weekly wage amounts to .17 (mass layoﬀ) and .15
(other layoﬀ or ﬁred) log points in the US, and to .13 and .9 log points in France. The
fall in hourly wage rate appears, again, slightly smaller: .14 and .15 log points in the
US and .11 and .07 log points in France. Overall, this suggests that French displaced
workers in the intermediate education group experience wage losses that amount,
on average, to about two thirds of those experienced by their US counterparts.
The cross-country diﬀerences in wage adjustments appear more pronounced for
individuals with a low level of education. In the US, low education workers displaced
in a Mass layoﬀ experience a larger fall in weekly wage (.23 log points) than workers
with an intermediate level of education and a comparable fall in hourly wage rates
19See for instance Swaim and Pogdursky (1987) and Houle and Van Audenrode (1995)
24(.14 log points). In France, low education workers displaced in a mass layoﬀ suﬀer
weekly wage losses of .10 log points and hourly wage losses of -.07 log points, which
appears to be smaller than the wage losses experienced by French workers with an
intermediate level of education. As a consequence, for low education individuals in
the mass layoﬀ group wage losses in France amount to only half of the estimated
wage losses for similar US workers. While several factors may explain smaller wage
adjustments in France than in the US, this speciﬁcity of wage adjustments at the
bottom end of the skill distribution might possibly be accounted for by the existence
of a binding minimum wage, a point we will return to in section 5. However,
comparison of workers in the Other layoﬀ / Fired group in the two countries yields
less clear cut conclusions since workers in this group seem to experience similar
weekly wage adjustments in the two countries.
Lastly, comparison of post-displacement wage adjustments for displaced workers
with a high level of education does not indicate any signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
France and the US. For both countries, estimates in columns 3 and 4 indicate similar
wage losses for each displacement group across the two countries. On the other
hand, the two displacement groups seem to experience, in both countries, very
diﬀerent patterns of post-displacement wage adjustments. While these results might
be interpreted as evidence that non-mass layoﬀ is more stigmatizing for highly skilled
individuals, one may also suspect that the distinction between these two causes of
separation might also appear less relevant for this education group. Furthermore one
should also emphasize that wage losses are not precisely estimated for this education
group.
Overall, several important features emerge from this comparison by level of
25education. Firstly, there does not seem to be any clear and systematic diﬀerences
in wage adjustments in the two countries, at the higher end of the skill distribution.
On the contrary, the wage losses seem to be lower in France than the US for the
low and intermediate levels of education. This seems particularly true for workers
at the bottom of the skill distribution and for hourly wage rate adjustments.
4.3 Wage losses and pre-displacement seniority
Finally, table 4 provides descriptive evidence on the impact of pre-displacement se-
niority on post-displacement wage adjustments. All estimates are based on equation
2 where the displacement dummy has been interacted with seniority on the job lost.
For workers displaced in a mass layoﬀ, higher seniority is signiﬁcantly associated
with higher wage losses consecutive to job displacement. In both countries, one
additional year of seniority increases losses in weekly wage by .015 log points. For
hourly wage rate, similar ﬁgures amount to .009 log points in France and .013 in the
US.
For workers displaced in circumstances other than a mass layoﬀ, pre-displacement
seniority does not aﬀect post-displacement wage losses. This may be explained by
the fact that this latter group includes both workers who have been laid-oﬀ and
worker who have been ﬁred for cause. If dismissal for poor individual performance
or behavior is more likely at the earliest stage of a worker career within a ﬁrm, then,
among individuals in the Other layoﬀ / Fired group, the proportion of individuals
who have been ﬁred for cause will be higher at low seniority levels. Furthermore
one would expect post-displacement wage adjustments to be higher for individuals
who have been ﬁred for cause, given pre-displacement seniority. On the contrary,
26among workers being terminated for exogenous reasons, one would expect higher
wage losses for more senior workers. These two eﬀect might then cancel out in
the heterogeneous group of workers ﬁred and displaced in a non-mass layoﬀ, if the
proportion of each sub-category varies with pre-displacement seniority.
5 Determinants of observed wage losses
We now turn to the economic determinants of observed wage adjustments following
job displacement. As already discussed, given a consistent estimate of returns
to seniority in each country, it is possible to decompose observed wage losses of
displaced workers into losses of seniority-accumulated earnings potential, A-losses,
and ﬁrm or match heterogeneity, S-losses. In the rest of the paper, I estimate the
eﬀect of job seniority on individual wage and implement the decomposition discussed
in section 3.1.2.
5.1 Returns to seniority
There has been an important debate surrounding the estimation of the eﬀect of
seniority on wages.20 As pointed out by several authors, the major estimation
problem stems from the possible endogeneity of seniority with respect to wages
in the presence of heterogeneous workers and/or ﬁrms. In order to solve this
endogeneity issue, I estimate returns to seniority using Topel (1991)’s two-step
estimation procedure. The estimation is performed for the period 1990-1997 for
France and 1978-1992 for the US. Results are presented in table 5.
20See Abraham-Farber (1987), Altonji-Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991) for the main
contributions to this debate.
27Comparison of columns 1 and 2 indicates very similar returns to experience and
seniority in the two countries. Early on the job, one additional year of seniority
rises hourly wage rate by .017 log points in both cases. The marginal eﬀect of
seniority on earnings decreases with time on the job. Concavity of wage-seniority
proﬁles appears slightly more pronounced in the US than in France: for instance,
10 years of seniority appear to increase wages by .14 log points in France against
.11 log points in the US. Regarding the eﬀect of general experience on earnings, one
should note that while the eﬀect of the linear term in experience appears larger in
France this is compensated by a more concave proﬁle. Overall the estimated eﬀect
of experience also seems very similar in the two economies: 20 years of experience
appear to increase wages by .22 log points in France against .20 log points in the
US.
These results should be compared to estimates found in previous research. The
eﬀect of seniority estimated here diﬀers from results reported in Topel (1991)’s
article. As can be seen by comparing columns 2 to 4 of table 6 this discrepancy
mostly results from the fact that Topel’s estimates make use of a wage variable
computed from yearly reports of earnings and hours worked. As demonstrated in
Altonji and Williams (1997) and Lefranc (forthcoming), the existence of important
measurement errors and inconsistencies in this latter variable leads such estimates to
overemphasize the eﬀect of seniority on earnings. On the other hand, results found
here agree with estimates reported in several recent papers. In particular, results
presented in columns 1 and 2 corroborate those presented in Altonji and Williams
(1997) and are also consistent with estimates based on match employer-employee
data that allow direct control for ﬁrm heterogeneity, e.g. Abowd et al. (1999) for
28France and Bronars and Famulary (1997) for the United States.
5.2 A-losses or S-losses ?
These estimates of the returns to seniority enable us to examine the structural
determinants of the gross wage losses examined in the previous section.
Table 6 presents estimates of the eﬀect of job displacement on hourly wage
rate net of the eﬀect of accumulated ﬁrm seniority, for France and the US. As
already explained, this corresponds to the extent of S-losses. Estimates for the total
sample are given in columns 1 and 2. Comparison of these two columns reveals
diﬀerent patterns of wage adjustments in the two countries for workers displaced in
a mass layoﬀ. In France, residual wage losses, i.e. change in the wage rate net of
accumulated returns to seniority, amount to only .03 log points. On the contrary, US
workers displaced under similar circumstances experience larger S-losses, around .08
log points. Compared to results presented in table 3, this indicates that, in France,
two thirds of observed adjustments in hourly wage rates are driven by A-losses and
only one third is explained by S-losses; in the US, the relative contribution of the
two sources of wage adjustments are reversed, with S-losses explaining between one
half to two thirds of total wage losses.
Comparison of average residual wage losses for workers in the Other layoﬀ /
Fired group apparently suggests that this pattern no longer holds for individuals in
this group. For this group, the extent of S-losses amount to about .09 log points in
both countries. However, separate estimates by level of education suggest that this
result is entirely driven by the higher education group. On the contrary, comparison
of wage adjustments in the medium and low education groups conﬁrms the small
29contribution of S-losses to post-displacement wage adjustments in France, relative
to the US. For the intermediate education group, the extent of S-losses in France
amounts to .046 log point for workers in the Mass layoﬀ group and a non-signiﬁcant
.034 in the Other layoﬀ / Fired group. For the US, S-losses appear more than twice
as large, amounting to .09 log points for the ﬁrst group and .11 for the second group.
The discrepancy between the two countries in the extent of S-losses appears even
more pronounced in the low education group: for this category, in France, none of
the two groups of displaced workers experience statistically signiﬁcant S-losses while
for their US counterpart S-losses amount to .08 log points and .04 log points for the
Mass layoﬀ and Other layoﬀ / Fired groups respectively, which represents, again,
between two-thirds and one half of total wage adjustments.
Several issues may challenge the validity of the decomposition underlying table
6. First, as discussed in section 2.3, part of accumulated ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings
potential may survive for workers ﬁnding re-employment in the same industry, in
which case table 6 may underestimate the extent of S-losses. Table 8 provides
estimates S-losses for the sub-sample of displaced workers who changed one-digit
industry upon re-remployment. Results partly support the above conjecture, to the
extent that estimated S-losses tend to be larger for industry switchers than for the
total sample.21 However, this table conﬁrms, ﬁrst, that for France, S-losses tend to
be small in comparison to the US case and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
low education workers and, second, that S-losses contribute an important fraction
of total hourly wage losses in the US.
21However, equality of S-losses between switchers and stayers is never rejected at the 5% level
except for high education non-mass layoﬀ in France and medium education non-mass layoﬀ in the
US.
30This decomposition may also lead to inconsistent estimates of S-losses if within-
ﬁrm wage growth diﬀers between displaced and non-displaced workers, before the
occurrence of job displacement. In fact, results in Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan
(1993a) indicate that earnings growth tend to be lower for displaced workers than for
job stayers several quarters before displacement. Table 9 compares pre-displacement
hourly wage growth of displaced workers to that of job stayers and ﬁnds little evi-
dence of lower pre-displacement wage growth, suggesting that the pre-displacement
dip in quarterly earnings is more likely to come from a reduction in the number of
hours worked rather than a fall in hourly wage rate.
5.3 Comments
Overall, these results clearly indicate that, despite fairly similar gross wage losses,
the nature of individual wage dynamics underlying the wage losses of displaced
workers diﬀers markedly between the two countries. In France, the change in log
hourly wage after displacement appears primarily driven by the loss of returns
to seniority accumulated on the pre-displacement job. In the US, forgone ﬁrm
seniority also appears to triggers signiﬁcant wage adjustments, around .054 log
points.22 But the major diﬀerence is that, in the US, on average, displaced workers
experience further wage losses due to a downgrading into job matches whose quality
is lower than the pre-displacement one. This ﬁnding conﬁrms previous results by,
among others, Topel and Ward (1992) that have underlined the importance of job
prospection in career dynamics of US workers. On the contrary, in France, this
22The slightly higher incidence of lost speciﬁc human capital on displaced workers wage losses
in France stems both from (slightly) higher returns to seniority and higher average seniority of
displaced workers in this country.
31downgrading into lower quality matches appears very moderate. This shows ﬁrstly
that French displaced workers do not fall into markedly intrinsically worse jobs and
secondly that career dynamics in France are essentially driven by intra-ﬁrm wage
growth and not by labor market job prospection.
Ultimately, this lack of S-losses in France may arise from several features of the
French labor market. In fact, on-the-job search will allow to access better paying
jobs under two conditions: ﬁrst the reception of alternative job oﬀers, and second
the existence of signiﬁcant gains from job mobility, which relates to existence of
signiﬁcant interﬁrm wage diﬀerentials. Hence the small extent of S-losses may either
result from a more compressed distribution of oﬀered wages, from slack labor demand
and the lack of alternative job oﬀers or from high unemployed worker’s reservation
wages. To some extent a comparison of S-losses for the medium and low education
groups may point out to the role of the French minimum wage in the explanation of
small S-losses in France. Columns 8 and 10 in table 6 indicate that in the US, the
extent of downgrading into lower paying jobs is quantitatively similar for low and
medium skill individuals which does not hold for France. While in France, both skill
groups share most of the speciﬁcities of the French labor market (job protection,
unemployment insurance, wage bargaining) they are likely to be diﬀerently aﬀected
by the existence of a high minimum wage that may limit external wage dynamics by
reducing both the scope of proﬁtable job mobility and the intensity of labor demand
for that skill group. However, this cannot explain the overall lower contribution
of S-losses to total wage losses in France and the explanation of this important
diﬀerence between the two countries should deserve further research.
326 Conclusions
Contrary to the common view of a sclerotic French labor market lacking individual
wage ﬂexibility, estimates obtained in this paper do indicate that job losses, in
France, lead to sizeable wage losses for displaced workers. In fact, while the order
of magnitude of these wage losses appears slightly lower than in the United States,
overall welfare losses could turn out to be higher in France, if one were to take into
account the higher duration of unemployment of displaced workers in France.
Yet, if welfare losses appear comparable in the two countries, my ﬁndings also
reveal that the determinants of observed outcomes markedly diﬀer. Losing one’s
job, on the French labor market, primarily leads to the loss of ﬁrm-speciﬁc earnings
potential accumulated prior to job displacement, indicating that individual wage
careers in France are essentially driven by intra-ﬁrm dynamics. In opposite, losing
one’s job on the US labor market also erodes the beneﬁts of extended job search
and bring workers down in the distribution of job oﬀers. While intra-ﬁrm wage
dynamics do play a role in individual careers, external labor market dynamics
and the accumulation of search rents through job prospection seems to strongly
contribute to individual wage growth, a phenomena that is hardly present in the
French labor market.
These results also provide useful indications on the factors responsible for these
diﬀerences in labor market dynamics in the two countries. While the forces governing
wage losses of displaced workers on the US labor market appear similar across skill
groups, the disaggregated analysis indicates that low education displaced workers
in France experience lower total wage losses and no signiﬁcant S-losses, two fea-
33tures that could stem from the existence of binding minimum wage. However,
the speciﬁc wage rigidities at the bottom of the French earnings distribution fall
short of explaining the overall cross-country diﬀerences in post-displacement wage
adjustment. More generally, several ingredients are likely to contribute to the limited
role of external mobility in individual wage growth, including high reservation wages,
mobility costs, slack labor demand, and wage compression. While the analysis
undertaken here cannot discriminate between these diﬀerent sources, this point
should deserve particular attention in future research.
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37Table 1: Labor market equilibrium and wage losses of displaced workers
Under Strategy I Under Strategy II
- the density of observed wages is - the density of observed wages is
wH with probability 1/2
wH(1 + g) with probability 1/2
wL with probability (1 − p)/2
wL(1 + g) with probability (1 − p)(1 − λ1)/2
wH with probability (p + λ1(1 − p))/2
wH(1 + g) with probability p/2
- unemployment rate is - unemployment rate is
1/(1 + 2λ0p) 1/(1 + 2λ0)
- unemployment duration is - unemployment duration is
1/λ0p 1/λ0
- the observed wage losses are - the observed wage losses are
∆I = g ∆II = g + λ1(1 − p)[wH − (1 + g)wL]/w
where w = pwH + (1 − p)wL
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40Table 4: Pre-displacement seniority and wage losses of displaced workers in France
and the United States
change in log weekly wage change in log hourly wage
France US France US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mass Layoﬀ -0.0308 -0.0641 -0.0334 -0.0538
(0.0162) (0.0314) (0.0169) (0.0252)
Mass Layoﬀ -0.0145 -0.0149 -0.0089 -0.0128
× predisplacement seniority (0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0017) (0.0028)
Other layoﬀ / Fired -0.1595 -0.1383 -0.1475 -0.1220
(0.0218) (.0192) 0.0228) (0.0154)
Other layoﬀ / Fired -0.0000 -0.0057 0.0022 -0.0016
× predisplacement seniority (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0026)
R2 0.04314 0.0343 0.0306 0.0345
n 21112 12020 21112 12020
Notes: - Mass Layoﬀ corresponds, in the US, to worker displaced after their “company folded, changed hands, moved
out of town, or employer died or went out of business” and in France to “licenciements collectifs” (i.e. more than 10
separations from a single ﬁrm); - all regressions include control for labor market experience, level of education, region
of residence and year dummies; Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
41Table 5: Returns to seniority in France and the United States
France US
PSID 78-92 PSID 78-92 Topel
dependant variable hourly wage hourly wage hourly wage hourly wage
(current) (yearly average) (yearly average)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First step estimates
Experience+Tenure 0.0555 0.0599 0.1129 0.1258
(0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0158) (0.0162)
Experience2/100 -0.189 -0.196 -0.213 -0.4067
(0.0798) (0.092) (0.1347) (0.1546)
Experience3/1000 0.0385 0.0416 0.041 0.0989
(0.0223) (0.0296) (0.0421) (0.0517)
Experience4/10000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.0089
(0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0058)
Tenure2/100 -0.038 -0.104 -0.492 -0.4592
(0.046) (0.0657) (0.1023) (0.108)
Tenure3/1000 0.0035 0.0308 0.1845 0.1846
(0.0201) (0.0328) (0.048) (0.0526)
Tenure4/10000 0.0005 -0.004 -0.023 -0.0245
(0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0069) (0.0079)
Second step estimates
Initial experience 0.0421 0.0421 0.0525 0.0713
(0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0173) (0.0181)
Tenure 0.0135 0.0178 0.0604 0.0545
(0.012) (0.0134) (0.0205) (.0079)
Notes: All estimates are based on Topel (1991)’s two-step model. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for sampling
errors in ﬁrst step estimates.
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43Table 7: Wage growth of displaced workers in France and sample selection
A - Reemployment probit model
(1)
Intercept 0.5408
(0.2434)
Experience -0.0213
(0.0059)
ULong 0.3462
(0.1845)
Other Layoﬀ / Fired -0.4737
(0.1650)
Other Layoﬀ / Fired * ULong -0.5362
(0.3412)
Other Layoﬀ / Fired * ShortSen 0.5120
(0.2096)
log likelihood -342.808
B- Wage growth equation
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.1939 0.2074 0.2183 0.1912
(0.0907) (0.1139) (0.0940) (0.1149)
Experience -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0053 -0.0061
(0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0030)
Other Layoﬀ / Fired -0.0433 -0.0551
(0.0436) (0.0521)
Lambda -0.0248 0.0617
(0.1255) (0.1499)
R2 0.0952 0.0954 0.0995 0.1002
n 224 224 224 224
Notes: - ULong equals one for individuals who have been unemployed for more than 9 months
at the time of the second interview (t − 1); ShortSen equals one for individuals with less than
one year of seniority in their pre-displacement job. Estimates in panel B are based on Heckman’s
two-steps sample selection model.
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